THE FALSE EXPECTATIONS OF MICHAEL PORTER’S STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK by Aktouf, Omar
INTRODUCTION
More than 20 years after its first publication, Michael Porter’s Competitive Strategy (1980) is
available in 17 languages and is in its 53rd printing. His Competitive Advantage (1985) has been reprinted
32 times, and the Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) brought Porter’s thought to the forefront of
development theories. He has published a dozen other books and more than 85 articles in the most
prestigious journals, and his ideas “quickly became the foundation of required courses at Harvard.”1
Indeed, Porter remains the field’s most cited author. In a recent work, La Stratégie des Organisations :
Une Synthèse,2 Porter is mentioned 60 times in the index, far ahead of classics such as Andrews (22 times),
Ansoff (9 times), Barnard (18 times), and Chandler (26 times).  The same is true for a book published in late
2000, Strategic Management,3 in which Porter is by far the most cited reference. Closer to home, the
journal Academy of Management Practices published an interview of Porter and devoted several articles
underlining the value of his contribution to administration science.
To what is this phenomenal success due? Brandenburger (2002) suggests that two factors account
for the longevity and extent of Porter’s influence:
1. His thought “gives a clear image of the essential activity of business. It depicts the whole
vertical chain of economic activity running from suppliers (i.e., owners of resources) through businesses
and on to the customers. It highlights the central role of business in creating value but also emphasizes
how businesses are interdependent with their suppliers and customers” (Brandenburger 2002: 58).
Brandenburger adds that in contrast to canonical economic models which assume atomized producers
and consumers, Porter’s model is more realistic in that it focuses on the reality of large businesses that
dominate many industries, that is, on situations of monopoly or oligopoly;
2. The very limited number of generic strategies that he advocates (differentiation and domination
by costs) is another element of clarity that attracts the attention of decision makers, consultants and
teachers to Porter’s model.
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But it is unlikely that clarity and accessibility
suffice to guarantee the wide diffusion of a given
work on management, in that most of what is written
about strategy is quite clear and accessible, without
those elements resulting in an unparalleled success.
Porter frames matters differently, in terms, he claims,
of making a contribution to science and of scientific
rigour. With regard to Competitive Advantage, he
maintained in an interview which was quite
revealing of the ins and outs of his thought: “There
was an opportunity to bring industrial organization
thinking into the study of strategy, and vice versa”
(Argyres et McGahan, 2002B: 43 ).4 As such, he
was the first author to bring together two discipli-
nes — industrial organization and strategy — to
provide a better discussion of strategic choices by
businesses. He went on to explain why this
discussion also had to rid itself of classical
economic thought: “Ceteris parabus assumptions
don’t work. Managers must consider everything. I
concluded that we needed frameworks rather than
models” (Argyres et McGahan, 2002B: 43 ). Lastly,
with regard to scientific rigour, he added: “We also
needed a more disciplined way to think about
strategy. We needed a more rigorous approach,
a systematic way to look at industries and where
firms stood in their industries” (Argyres et
McGahan, 2002B: 43-44 ).
In the following pages, we attempt to show
that while Porter’s framework is the basis of a
systematic approach to strategy, it in no way
guarantees the scientific rigor he claims for it and
furthermore, does not assure the achievement of a
lasting, defensible and non-easily imitable
competitive advantage. In addition, we try to shed
further light as to why his work has been attractive
for so long to a significant proportion of western
management, business consultants and academics.
We discuss each of his three pivotal works —
Competitive Strategy, Competitive Advantage and
The Competitive Advantage of Nations — in order
to draw out their foundations, to reveal how their
purported scientificity is non-demonstrable, and to
point to the epistemological and methodological
insufficiencies which seriously undermine Porter’s
claims to academic rigour. We also visit two other
schools of thought, namely the Resource Based
View and advocates of co-operation and
collaboration,  which not only highlight practical
and operational weaknesses in Porter’s proposed
framework, but also serve to reinforce our view of
epistemological and methodological insufficiencies.
We present our own arguments about the real
reasons for the success enjoyed by Porter’s
thought. At the ideological level, we suggest that
this success is due to an argument that legitimizes
the current state of relations of force within
businesses operating in advanced capitalism,
between these businesses, and between nations.
The legitimizing power of his thought makes it an
ideal wellspring from which dominants can draw
arguments and reasons of a scientific nature to
justify the situations of domination from which they
benefit. At the operational level, we suggest that
his success is due to concepts that offer ease of
comprehension, relative ease of implementation
and subsequent gratification from initial (but very
often non-lasting, nor easily defendable)
operational successes.
 Porter’s theoretical structure is based on a
1979 influential article in the Harvard Business
Review which focused on the analysis of the
environment and corporate sector in order to de-
termine strategic positioning (Porter, 1979).
Competitive Strategy (Porter, 1980) was an
extension of this article. Competitive Advantage
(Porter, 1985), as we will see, was devoted to one of
the gaps in the two preceding publications, namely,
the microeconomic dimensions of his theory. Lastly,
The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Porter,
1990) is a generalization of his theoretical corpus to
national industrial policies and development.
DOCTRINE OF POSITIONING AND
LEGITIMATING DOMINATION
In contrast to the authors who preceded him
in the field of strategy, Porter is an advocate of the
strategic positioning of a business in a given
industry (Porter, 1979, 1980). This approach was
novel in that previous authors in the area of strategy
largely devoted their attention either to the
elaboration of strategies or to strategic planning
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). However, the notion of
competitive advantage, which would come to
occupy a central place in his work, was absent,
only barely mentioned. According to Porter,
strategic positioning derived from an exhaustive
analysis of a certain number of factors which he
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baptized as “the five competitive forces”:
competitive rivalry, bargaining power of suppliers,
bargaining power of buyers, threat of new entrants,
and threat of substitutes. These five forces, which
“[e]merged as an encompassing way to look at an
industry,” as Argyres and McGahan (2002B: 44)
put it, are supposed to be the most relevant and
most significant indicators for any business seeking
to penetrate and make profitable the industry which
suits it best.
Logically, it is argued, the analysis of these
indicators leads to a business’s strategic
positioning in an industry in which there is:
- little competition;
- suppliers and buyers with weak
negotiating power;
- high entry barriers;
- few substitute products.
In its under these circumstances, it is claimed,
that a business can maximize profits: “I decided
that fundamental to any theory of positioning had
to be superior profitability” (Argyres and McGahan,
2002B: 44). It should also be noted that Porter seeks
to situate his theory in a normative perspective,
something which he takes pains to stress: “My work
aims not to be descriptive but normative. What
principles explain successful strategies? I believe
strongly that managers can apply these principles
prospectively, and that most do” (Argyres and
McGahan, 2002B: 44).
Up to this point, businesses are a kind of
black box in Porter’s work, inasmuch as he chose to
situate his analysis at the meso-economic level, that
is, the industry level. The criticisms of this choice
led him, in Competitive Strategy, to integrate the
microeconomic level into his model via the notion
of the value chain. We return to this point below.
For the moment, we discuss two major issues —
one epistemological in nature, the other dealing with
the theory’s normative dimension — raised by the
part of his work focused exclusively on positioning.
Firstly, how does Porter justify his
epistemological decision to set the level of analysis
at the industry level? As we have learned from the
science of complexity, the choice of the
organizational level to analyze determines the scope
of the results of the analysis. Why is the analysis
of competitive forces more relevant in strategy? In
canonical management terms, why should the
strategist’s interest be focused on the environment
and only on the environment? To be sure, there
was a real need in the field of strategy to go beyond
existing models, such as the BCG portfolio model
or models based on an analysis of advantages and
disadvantages, which limited themselves to the
microeconomic level. However, this does not suffice
to justify the epistemological choice made by Porter,
who does not develop his argument any further.
The question remains, and leads one to believe that
there is a certain arbitrariness to this choice.
Moreover, one wonders what logic and which
criteria underlie Porter’s identification of the number
and nature of competitive forces. The only argument
invoked by Porter is that when he began his research
he took his inspiration from industrial organization,
which discussed phenomena such as monopsony
(a situation in which there is only one customer for
a company’s product). He also acknowledges that
the notion of substitution already existed in
economic thought. But he maintains that it was
necessary to go further by imagining a series of
factors integrated within the same kind of framework
for analyzing industries. In the same interview
quoted above, however, he maintains two different
arguments about the identification, the nature and
the number of these factors. On the one hand, he
argues that “[t]hese dimensions…have to be
intuitively grounded” (Argyres and McGahan,
2002B: 46). A little further on, on the other hand,
he corrects himself and claims that: “I didn’t
come to the conclusion that there were five for-
ces until I’d looked at hundreds of industries”
(Argyres and McGahan, 2002B: 46). Intuition and
case studies are not mutually exclusive; they can
even be complementary, with the case study
confirming or invalidating the intuition. But this
is not the problem. The real problem is at the
level of generalization or more specifically, at the
level of the argument supporting the
generalization. However, Porter is silent on this
point. We return below to the issue of the
generalization of case studies since it is a problem
that pervades all of Porter’s thought. For the
moment, we bring up another objection. Whether
we situate ourselves with respect to Popperian
falsification (Popper, 1972) or Habermas’s (1990)
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communicative ethics, Porter’s position is
untenable.
According to Popper, a proposition is not
true because it has been verified by one or several
empirical experiences, as is claimed by rigid
positivism. It is true for only so long as an example
does not contradict it, that is, until it has been
falsified. With respect to the number of competitive
forces, it is simple enough to imagine a good number
of industries in which other competitive forces are
much more determinant than those identified by
Porter: government in the arms and pharmaceutical
industries; non-government organizations in the
hydrocarbon industry, etc. This points to the
extreme fragility of the universality of Porter’s model.
For Habermas, the morality of a given utterance
depends on the dialogical exchange made up of a
claim to validity by a speaker, objections to this
claim by other speakers, and arguments by the
speaker in response to these objections, all of which
occurs within the framework of a space of free
speech. The problem here is that Porter’s positivism
imposes the number and nature of competitive for-
ces and the result of the ensuing analysis of
industries as scientific and therefore non-debatable
truths. It is in this sense that Porter’s model is a
formidable instrument of domination. There are no
possible grounds of legitimacy for questioning the
model’s components and results within a given
business. This domination is exercised by expert
analysts and their constituents, senior management.
This element appears as an unacknowledged
foundation running throughout Porter’s thought.
Continuing in an epistemological vein,
Porter’s thought is characterized by environmental
determinism, in that he glosses over an enactment
phenomenon which has for some time been viewed
as central in the analysis of environment in
management studies (Morgan, 1986). The process
of enactment is the process through which we
proactively shape and structure our realities in an
unconscious manner. As Morgan states (1986: 130),
“although we often see ourselves as living in a
reality with objective characteristics, life demands
much more of us than this. It requires that we take
an active role in bringing our realities into being
through various interpretive schemes, even though
these realities may then have a habit of imposing
themselves on us as “the way things are”…”.  This
phenomenon appears to produce at least as many
projections (from the point of view and the interest
of those conducting the analysis) about the
characteristics of the environment under study as
those which are really “measured” or “observed.”
This is in addition to the inevitable changes brought
about by any “sector study” in any environment
when the study gives rise to strategies and the
implementation of decisions that are likely to have
an impact on the environment. In this event, it is no
longer the environment that determines corporate
strategy, but the reverse. Over 30 years ago, this
position was seriously discussed, illustrated and
confirmed with concrete, edifying examples
(Galbraith, 1967). In particular, Galbraith showed
how the (strategic) planning of certain GM and Ford
car models (his analysis focused on the Mustang,
for which six years elapsed between the design
phase and the marketing phase) contributed to
determining — in defiance of all so-called market
laws — internal and external salaries as well as the
price of products such as rubber, iron, coal, steel,
etc., and this for a number of years. This analysis
contributes to demonstrating how the policies of
large corporations “manufacture” to a large extent
domestic and international environments and
completely distort the play of competition.
Secondly, for Porter’s recommendations with
regard to industry analysis to be normative and
prescriptive, they have to permit an ex-ante
identification of the industries which best suit the
business seeking to position itself. As we have
seen, this industry must display competitive for-
ces that are favourable to the business. Is it
possible to do this before the fact? It is possible
but only in particular cases and given a condition
which is impossible to fulfill. Positioning a business
in an industry through the analysis of competitive
forces can occur in the case of an entrepreneurial
situation in which the business or the business
division does not yet exist. For it is difficult to ima-
gine an industry, that really exists, with such
favourable conditions for a business to be able to
exercise its domination, that is, with businesses that
have never considered the possibilities offered by
their industry. There can only be one explanation
of this — these businesses have not received the
services of experts and consultants trained in
Porter’s industry analysis. But in this case, how
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did these businesses make decision before the
appearance of this model? This impasse brings us
again to the true logical outcome of this mode:
handing the lion’s share of power over to experts
and analysts.
In the event of a business already operating
in a given industry, Porter’s model will lead it either
to exit (inasmuch as the competitive forces are
unfavourable) or to remain in it because the analysis
of the competitive forces reveals that it dominates
the industry. But the analysis will never enable the
business to know how to change its situation if it is
precarious. As such, the claim that Porter’s model
is normative is without foundation. On the other
hand, it will enable the ex-ante justification of a
monopoly or oligopoly situation since the analysis
of the competitive forces will show that it is quite
normal for a business or businesses to have a
monopoly or oligopoly in an industry in which they
positioned themselves as a function of the nature
of the competitive forces. It is for this reason that
Porter’s model should be viewed from the
perspective of a legitimization of situations of
domination by the most powerful companies with
the help of a seemingly learned discourse. It also
accounts for Porter’s aversion to anti-trust
regulations, which he expresses in, among other
places, the chapter devoted to the United States in
The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Porter,
1990: 728 ff.)
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AN THE
EXPERT’S APOLOGY
Of all the inadequacies identified in
Competitive Strategy, Porter is particularly, if not
exclusively open to a single criticism: determining
the positioning of a business in a given industry
without inquiring into the business’s fit (in terms
of its capacities, its resources, its abilities, etc.) with
the suggested position could in certain cases lead
businesses to enter industries which do not suit
them at all. In other words, Porter felt obliged to
turn to the microeconomic aspects of his doctrine.
The reason for being of Competitive
Advantage is specifically to respond to this
problem. As such the notion of competitive
advantage ceased to play a preponderant role in
Porter’s thought: “I decided I needed to say
something about positioning…connected to
competitive advantage” (Argyres and McGahan,
2002b: 47). However, profitability continues to play
a pivotal role in his reasoning: “required competitive
advantage, and fundamental to any thinking about
competitive advantage was scope, or the breadth
of the company’s strategic target. That led to the
generic strategies” (Argyres and McGahan 2002b:
44). Competitive advantage follows on the heels of
the specific, unique value that the business
produces to the benefit of different groups of
consumers. It is for this reason that the business
“needs to develop a unique set of skills that other
organizations don’t have” (Argyres and McGahan
2002b: 47). These abilities are supposed to be
incorporated into the business’s activities, but
attaining them requires a detailed analysis of
these very activities, which Porter groups under
another fundamental notion in his thought — the
value chain.
At first glance, Porter appears to have given
a coherent response to a flaw in his earlier works.
This at least is what is claimed by the mainstream
literature in the field of strategy. However, a close
examination of his discourse about competitive
advantage, the value chain and generic strategies
reveals several tensions, which, as was the case
with Competitive Strategy, bring seriously into
question the scientific worth of his theory.
We begin here with Jeremy Klein’s (2000)
apposite remarks in this connection. Porter’s
definition of competitive advantage is problematic,
in that it is ambiguous, tautological or marred by a
serious ontological confusion. Porter writes that
“[c]ompetitive advantage grows fundamentally out
of the value a firm is able to create for its buyers
that exceeds the firm’s cost of creating it” (Porter,
1985: 30). As Klein notes, this in no way defines
competitive advantage, unless, one might be
tempted to suggest, one agrees to lump competitive
advantage with value. In this case, and even if we
ignore the problems engendered by this confusion,
and bearing in mind that the question of value has
divided theorists for decades, competitive
advantage loses its relevance as a central notion in
strategic thinking. Therein lies the ambiguity of this
definition. Moreover, when Porter claims that
“[c]ompetitive advantage is at the heart of a firm’s
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performance in competitive markets” (Porter, 1985:
XV), not only is the issue of the definition of
competitive advantage glossed over, but Porter’s
claim is clearly tautological. In addition, as Klein
points out, defining something exclusively in terms
of its consequences logically means that the
consequences are known ex-ante and must have
emerged prior to the thing itself, something which
is a logical impossibility, especially when the
reasoning is empirical in nature, as is the case with
Porter. As such, the notion of competitive advantage
cannot be used before the fact to explain what
occurs after the fact, namely, a business’s
competitive performance. In this light, Porter’s claim
that his theory is normative is devoid of meaning.
It is for this reason that we feel justified in pointing
to a profound contradiction pervading the entirety
of the Porterian approach. His initial objective was
to provide a normative framework for business
strategy; however, its formalism yields an analytic
approach which has no prescriptive power.
Let us take things further. For competitive
advantage to be genuinely efficacious, it is
absolutely necessary for it to be impossible to imitate
it. However, for this condition to be met, it is
necessary that competitive advantage be
impossible to be identified, even, paradoxically, by
the company that situates it at the heart of its
strategy. Indeed, in the highly hypothetical case in
which competitive advantage and the analytical
process leading to its identification could be
theorized as Porter claims, all businesses would be
able to carry it out and thereby procure the same
competitive advantages. In this event, “advantage”
and “competitive” become instances of the abusive
use of language. There is only one irrefutable way
out of this impasse for Porter’s theory. Its
importance is crucial inasmuch as it clearly identifies
both the implicit and never stated implications of
this theory and the underlying reasons for its
success; it is not because of the existence of a for-
mal strategic analytic framework that all businesses
manage to use it adequately as a means of
identifying their competitive advantage. It is a field
of scientific expertise in which only “high-powered”
experts and consultants can operate effectively.
Leaving aside for the moment the intrinsic
limitations of this view of things (we come back it
shortly), let us focus on how the scientific aura
that Porter seeks to give his theory ultimately ser-
ves to legitimize the inordinate power accorded to
experts and consultants, a group to which Porter
himself belongs. We made the same discovery with
regard to Competitive Strategy, and now we have
come to the same conclusion with regard to
Competitive Advantage. This observation strikes
us as one of the most significant reasons
underlying the success of Porter’s work among
consultants. The analysis of the value chain yields
the same result.
Porter firmly argues that there are two generic
strategies — domination by cost and differentiation.
A fundamental question must be asked: What
exactly does the notion of differentiation mean for
Porter? What is differentiated, the business or the
product? According to Porter, it is the business: “A
firm differentiates itself from its competitors when
it provides something unique that is valuable to
buyers beyond simply offering a low price” (Porter,
1985: 120). The “beyond simply offering a low price”
clearly refers to competitive advantage. But as we
showed above, the concept of competitive
advantage is too ambiguous to signify anything
precise. At best, differentiation means something
different depending on whether one is in the
position of a company’s directors (it is the business
that is differentiated, which is Porter’s point of view)
or in that of the employees and the consumers (for
whom “differentiated” only concerns the product).
As for domination by cost, it is neither more nor
less than the reuse of an old neoclassical economic
notion, and largely concerned with minimizing costs
with a view to maximizing profits. Lastly, in limiting
himself to two formal generic strategies, Porter
excludes anything connected with emergent,
creative and innovative strategic notions.
Lastly, the value chain is a schematic
representation of business activities, broken down
into main activities and supporting activities, each
one likely to contain value enabling the business
to acquire a competitive advantage. The task of the
expert or consultant is to sketch this representation,
study each activity on its own, and identify which
one will give the business the value which will pro-
cure a competitive advantage. The analytic aspect
of Porter’s conception of strategy gains in strength
and consolidates once again the influence of
experts and consultants. In methodological terms,
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this way of doing things is akin to the Cartesian
method of analysis, and suffers from the same
inadequacies. A Cartesian attitude towards a
complex problem (determining the source of a
specific value within a business with countless
activities) involves subdividing it into a number of
simple problems (breaking down the business’s
activities into so many easy-to-study activities) and
to examine each activity on its own, without
considering the others. Once all these simple
problems are resolved, it is only a matter of
reconstituting the whole. We now know that there
is no validity to this kind of reasoning, given that it
presupposes that the whole (the business) is merely
the sum of it its parts (the business’s activities).
This view, however, amounts to a major
epistemological error. Twentieth century science
has shown that the whole is made up of often
complex relationships among the parts, and not
merely the juxtaposition of the parts. In other words,
it is less important to understand each part in its
singularity than to understand the singularity of
the relationships this part has with the other parts
and the specificity of the relationships binding
together the parts of the whole.
Returning to the analysis of the value chain
according to Porter’s teachings, it is quite likely
that activity identified, after having examined it on
its own, as yielding the value which will procure a
competitive advantage will not necessarily be
identified in these terms if it is analyzed in relation
to other activities. This indicates the extent to which
Porter remains a prisoner of the linear, fragmented
reasoning of classical science and the most
simplistic elements it has to offer. However, if
Porter’s writings have been successful, it is because
this simplicity is easy to present in the business
and consulting worlds, neither of which are
particularly familiar with epistemological reflection.
It is thus not illegitimate to speak here in terms of
the false representation of a current of thought, the
scientific value of which stems from the ignorance
of those for whom it is intended.
In a similar vein and for the same reasons, no
one or almost no one has identified another very
serious limitation of Porter’s ideas.  Porter explicitly
assumes the omniscience and the absolute
rationality of experts and consultants who are able
to find, fit together and analyze a significant sum of
data about competitive forces and about the
components of the value chain. As such, Porter
scorns the generally acknowledged observation in
organizational theory regarding the limited
rationality of individuals, namely, that there is
limit to the amount of information that human
beings can process. Even computer simulations
cannot resolve this problem. On the one hand, it
is difficult to standardize, as we have seen, the
determining factors common to all industries,
and on the other hand, the simulation is the
application of a computer program designed on
the basis of an algorithm constructed by human
beings, that is, the same human beings
characterized by their limited rationality.
One last, ontological remark in this
connection is necessary. Situating the value
produced by a business at the level of its activities
is not at all obvious, and requires an argument to
this end. However, Porter is content to claim this
phenomenon, limiting himself to decreeing it in a
self-referential discourse. The consequences of this
are significant. Firstly, it amounts to a reification of
the business through its activities. Secondly, the
fact of rooting value in activities occludes the role
that employees can play in the creation of value,
which is wrongly attributed to the “business.” But
this occlusion plays a highly ideological role, that
of avoiding at all costs the social and political
dimensions of the business that is the object of the
strategic analysis. Furthermore, as we shall see in
the following section where we visit the resource
based theorists, it becomes evident that Porter’s
lack of attention on the role of the employee, worker
morale, level of management leadership and
interpersonal skills to bring out the maximum
potential of employees, etc. poses serious
limitations to the operational effectiveness of his
framework in attaining a lasting, defensible and not
easily imitable competitive advantage.
PORTER VS THE RESOURCE BASED
THEORISTS
In Competitive Advantage (1985A), Porter’s
“value chain” model attempts to analyse the
sources of competitive advantage by examining all
the activities a company performs and how they
are linked together. But intrinsic factors such as
corporate culture, worker morale, level of
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communication and team spirit, level of management
leadership and interpersonal skills to bring out the
maximum potential of employees, etc. are not
considered in his analysis. In Technology and
Competitive Advantage (1985B) he uses a similar
approach to Competitive Advantage in identifying
all primary and supporting technologies a firm may
be involved within the “value chain”. He then states
how a company should try to identify the core
technologies that have significant impacts towards
achieving a competitive advantage. Superficial
attention is given to the significance of a company’s
internal resources when he refers to “relative
technological skills”, whereby he states that it
is a function of many factors such as
management,  company culture,  and
organisational structure. He also adds “use
acquisitions or joint ventures to introduce new
technological skills to the corporation, or to
invigorate existing skills”. But as in Competitive
Advantage, intrinsic factors that can lead to
creation or further advancement of technology
innovation is hardly mentioned. Furthermore, the
complexities and effects of corporate cultures
that are encountered on integrating new
technologies in situations of acquisitions are not
addressed in any meaningful manner.
The resource based approach emerged in
1990 with Prahalad and Hamel’s article on “core
competence” followed by Stalk, Evans, and
Schulman’s (1992) article on “capabilities-based
competition”. Supporters of the resource-based
approach take the view that the competitive
environment of the 1990’s and beyond has changed
significantly such that the structural approach
represented by Porter’s competitive-forces
framework is no longer effective.  Prahalad and
Hamel’s (1990) definition of core competencies is
“the collective learning in the organisation,
especially how to co-ordinate diverse production
skills and integrate multiple streams of
technologies”. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) focused
on corporate wide technologies and production
skills in defining core competencies while Stalk,
Evans, and Shulman (1992) took a broader value
chain or business process view of the skill base in
defining capabilities. According to Stalk, Evans, and
Schulman (1992), the “war of position” was a
strategy that a company could follow when the
economy was relatively static, characterised by
“durable products”, stable consumer needs, well
defined national and regional markets, and clearly
defined competitors. They contend that
“competition is now a “war of movement” in which
success depends on anticipation of market trends
and quick response to changing customer needs”.
They added “…In such an environment,  the
essence of strategy is not the structure  of a
company’s product and market but the dynamics
of its behaviour”. In contrast to Porter (1980, 1985A),
both their work examine the behavioural “how” a
company chooses to compete rather than the
“where” it chooses to compete and contend that
competitive advantage should be found in
resources and skills within the company, as
opposed to the general market environment
“outside” the company.
In Towards a Dynamic Theory of Strategy
(1991), Porter acknowledges the resource based
approach as one of three “promising” streams of
research that attempt to address the challenge of
developing a truly dynamic theory of strategy. He
argues though that the resource based view is but
an intermediate step in understanding the true
source of competitive advantage and that ultimately
“resources are not valuable in and of themselves”,
but “are only meaningful in the context of
performing certain activities to achieve certain
competitive advantages”. For Porter (1991),
“competitive advantage derives from more than just
resources…It is the collective advantages gained
from all sources that determines relative
performance”. He concludes that it is even
questionable how far we need to go up the chain of
causality to generate a truly dynamic theory of
strategy, or as he puts it “we need to know how
necessary or helpful it is to push even further back
in the chain of causality…an important theoretical
issue is where in the chain of causality to best cut
into the problem…it should be said that
understanding the ultimate origins of advantage
may not always be necessary for thinking about
how to improve future advantage”. In his view, more
emphasis should be put on “crafting empirical
research to make further progress in understanding
these questions”. He seems to imply that
understanding and harnessing the underlying
fundamentals that foster competitive advantage is
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not as important as generating empirical models
that may well work today, and surely he hopes will
work tomorrow without need for radical
modifications. But as Stalk, Evans and Schulman
stated back in 1992 the environment is now a much
more turbulent environment with unexpected
perturbations. From a methodological point of view,
it would seem that to deflect fundamental work and
to only depend on continuous overlapping layers
of empirical studies is a reactive strategy
tantamount to increasing the magnitude of the “day
of reckoning” when conditions will be so dynamic
and unpredictable that all empirical work will be as
good as useless while no fundamental work will
have been done towards trying to truly understand,
and subsequently co-exist with these conditions.
In Porter’s defence, at the time of his writing this
article, one can say that the resource based view
was still in its infancy and probably not advanced
enough in trying to determine the true source of
competitive advantage.  In the ensuing years it
suffered, as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 48) point
out, from a somewhat blurred focus because of the
lack of agreed-upon and well-defined definition of
terms, or as quoted by Teece, Pisano, and Shuen
(1991: 17-18): “There resources, capabilities,
skills…and the conceptual framework is
overdetermined in that there are too many
competing explanations for the phenomena
identified”.  In looking at various resource based
articles, we still see this fuzziness, although we will
attempt to portray one type of philosophy within
this view as being the fundamental building block
towards competitive advantage.
In recent history many have identified a
number of explicit attributes towards attaining
competitive advantage. For example, there was To-
tal Quality Management (TQM) from the 80’s to
the early or mid-90’s, technology roughly
throughout the same period extending into the late
90’s, and knowledge management and innovation
from the mid-90’s to the present day period. But is
there a more fundamental element which transcends
all these attributes? If we look at TQM, many in the
west lauded the Japanese mastery of quality and
resulting competitive advantage, and in response,
proceeded to implement TQM methods. A study
by Powell (1995) however examined the
effectiveness of TQM as competitive advantage
and noted that “potential TQM adopters may not
appreciate that TQM success depends not only on
adopting the TQM attributes, but also on pre-
existence of complementary factors apparently
unrelated to TQM, yet more difficult to imitate than
TQM itself”. It appears to require a culture receptive
to change, a motivation to improve, people capable
of understanding and implementing TQM’s peculi-
ar set of practices as well as corporate perseverance.
But more fundamentally, he reports in his literature
review, that it appears to require a complete
restructuring of social relationships both within the
firm and among the firm and its stakeholders. He
states “Under TQM, firms must reconstitute all
these relationships among employees and between
managers and employees. And they must
reconstitute them more or less at the same time”.
We agree with him that this social re-engineering is
usually beyond the capabilities of most firms. His
study concluded that firms who implement TQM
procedures do not produce performance advantages
if they do not create a culture within which these
procedures can thrive; namely, executive
commitment, an open organisation, employee
empowerment, and good reputation with suppliers
and customers. His overall conclusion is that
although TQM can produce competitive
advantage, “adopting the vocabularies, ideologies,
and tools promoted by the TQM gurus and
advocates matters less than the underlying
intangible resources that make TQM implementation
successful”. As Agayo (1990) illustrates in his book
on quality implementation (chiefly inspired by the
views and notions of W. Edwards Deming), much
of what is required to implement quality within the
work place has less to do with metrics or
sophisticated gadgetry and more with, as Demings
once stated, “pride of workmanship”. The source
of competitive advantage seems to be pointing
towards people: by people, we mean employees,
management and the social-corporate
environment in which they work. Even Nonaka and
Takeuchi’s (1995) work on knowledge management,
which is primarily interested with the process of
creating, harnessing and managing knowledge and
innovation, is really pointing back to the process
of interaction and the managing of people. Thus
our position is that people are the true source of
competitive advantage.
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Pfeffer (1994) seems to advocate this view in
Competitive Advantage Through People where he
looks at the 5 top performing companies on the
stock market in North America from 1972 to 1992 (in
ascending order Plenum Publishing with 15,689%,
Circuit City with 16,410%, Tyson Foods with
18,118%, Walmart with 19,807% and Southwest
Airlines with 21,775%). These companies would
have met the exact opposite criteria of what Porter’s
framework of five fundamental competitive forces
recommends. The industries in which these top
companies are involved (retailing, airlines,
publishing and food processing) were
“characterised by massive competition and
horrendous losses, widespread bankruptcy,
virtually no barriers to entry (for airlines after 1978),
little unique or proprietary technology, and many
substitute products or services. And in 1972, none
of these firms was (and some still are not) the
market-share leader, enjoying economies of scale
or moving down the learning curve”. He goes on to
show that what these five firms have in common is
how they manage their work force.  The reason
why SouthWest Airlines achieved a cost advantage
comes from a “very productive, very motivated and
(by the way) unionised workforce”. But as he
explains, this cost advantage is not easily imitable
by competitors due to the fact that the culture
and practices that enable SouthWest to achieve
this success are not easily obvious. “It is often
hard to comprehend the dynamics of a particu-
lar company and how it operates because the
way people are managed often fits together as a
system. It is easy to copy one thing, but much
more difficult to copy numerous things that fit
together in a system.  This is because the change
needs to be more comprehensive and also
because the ability to understand the system of
management practices is hindered by its
extensiveness”. In his Putting People First For An
Organisational Success (1999), he presents in detail
seven practices of successful companies:
1)   Employment Security
2) Selective Hiring
3) Self-Managed Teams and Decentralisation
as Basic Elements of Organisational Design
4) Comparatively High Compensation
Contingent on Organisational Performance (not
individual performance)
5) Extensive Training
6) Reduction of Status Differences
7) Sharing Information
He states that, in general, companies have
about a one in eight chance of succeeding at this
since they often attempt “piecemeal innovation”
and therefore fail, or many of the ones that do try to
integrate all these practices give up before the
results are forthcoming.
In Creating Advantage, Porter (1997) refers
to the need and importance for innovation and how
a company needs to master technologies such that
it can apply and integrate it (and not just make the
scientific breakthroughs). It is taken as a “given”
that it can be done irrespective of the organisational
environment within the firm once everyone at the
executive and strategic level accept that this is an
important attribute to strive for.  But few companies
which have adopted this approach have been able
to distinguish themselves from the rest of their
competitors in any significant or lasting manner in
their respective industries.  It is an easy-to-adopt
concept which, as long as no extra effort is taken to
instil the internal dynamics and conditions to make
it happen, remains easily imitable. This internal or
intrinsic ingredient is the non-imitable portion of
the formula. And unlike Porter’s view in Innovation:
Location Matters (2001), it is primarily created by
forces within the company as opposed to forces in
the external environment. These forces are created
by people within the firm. By primarily focusing on
the external forces many managers have lost touch
with people even though they know how important
they are towards achieving competitive advantage.
As Bartlett (2002) mentions, “most managers see
the strategic implications of the information-based,
knowledge-driven, service-intensive
economy….They know that skilled people are key,
and yet, a decade of delayering, destaffing,
restructuring and reengineering has produced
people who are more exhausted or cynical than
empowered….developing internal resources and
capabilities is more difficult to imitate….Senior
managers must move beyond slogans, and develop
commitment to a set of beliefs that not only are
articulated in clear terms, but also are reflected in
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daily actions and decisions.”
To simply generate a strategy at the level to
which Porter advocated in his school of positioning
in the 1980’s and 1990’s would be missing enormous
fundamental issues which a firm needs to assess
and harness in order to be truly successful in
attaining a sustainable competitive advantage. But
Porter’s framework is attractive in both its relative
simplicity to comprehend and, more importantly,
relative ease of co-ordination to implement. A
strategy of acquisition and positioning is much
easier to implement (and imitate) than, as Pfeffer
(1999) pointed out, trying to put in place a culture
and organisation that seeks strength from within
the firm. Ease of understanding and relative ease
(not withstanding financial resources) of
implementation is the reason why we believe many
consultants to this day have been successful in
attracting client-firms to the Porterian view. It is
another question as to whether firms have been
truly successful in acquiring lasting advantages
from this strategy.
THE DIAMOND MODEL AND WORLD
HEGEMONY
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations
(Porter, 1990), Porter seeks to generalize his
theoretical corpus to encompass the global
economy. His main objective is to answer the
question: “Why does a nation achieve international
success in a particular industry?” (Porter, 1990: 71).
In light of this attempted extension, he establishes
at the conclusion of the book a typology of national
economies throughout the world and makes claims
about what the future strategies of some them
should be (Singapore, South Korea, Italy, Sweden,
Denmark, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, United
Kingdom, United States).
Porter’s model, known in the literature on
strategy as the “diamond model” has four
interrelated “determinants”, the schematic
representation of which resembles the geometric
form of a diamond (Porter, 1990: 72). These
determinants are (Porter, 1990: 70):
- Factor conditions. The nation’s position
in factors of production, such as skilled labor or
infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given
industry;
- Demand conditions. The nature of home
demand for the industry’s product of service;
- Related and supporting industries. The
presence or absence in the nation of supplier
industries and related industries that are
internationally competitive;
- Firm strategy, structure and rivalry. The
conditions in the nation governing how companies
are created, organized, and managed, and the nature
of domestic rivalry.
Two other determinants are mentioned —
government and chance —, though neither is
viewed as sufficiently relevant to be formally
integrated into the model.
Porter concludes that businesses procure a
competitive advantage in their industries and
internationally in three cases:
- When their home base allows and
supports the most rapid accumulation of specialized
assets and skills, sometimes solely to greater
commitment;
- When their home base affords better
ongoing information and insight into product and
process needs;
- When the goals of owners, managers, and
employees support intensive commitment and
sustained investment, (Porter 1990: 71)
Most of the book is devoted to presenting
the model and the success conditions for the
economic strategies of nations, with strong
references to case studies. The book ultimately
classifies economies into a linear typology that
follows the evolution of national competitiveness
since the Second World War. Four stages are
identified:  factor-driven competitiveness,
investment-driven competitiveness, innovation-
driven competitiveness, and wealth-driven
competitiveness (Porter, 1990: 685). Each of the ten
economies he studies is situated in one or another
stage and must strive to move to the next stage,
with the exception of two cases, for which the
recommendation is that they move to a prior stage.
In ascending order, Singapore, South Korea, Italy
and Japan are at the first stage and must move
forward; the United States, the United Kingdom
and Germany are at the third stage and must move
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to the fourth; and lastly, Sweden and Denmark are
also at the third stage, but should move back to the
second stage.
Our objective here is not to examine each case
and to test the validity of the analysis; that would
amount to accepting Porter’s diamond model and
linear reasoning. What we must do here is see
whether this model and this reasoning are on a solid
footing.
We can begin by taking up the same
discussion of this model and its results as we
conducted in our effort to show the subjectivity,
indeed, the arbitrariness, in the identification of the
nature and number of competitive forces. Porter
claims that he is filling a gap with a new integrated
framework for understanding world economies.
However, notions like factor endowment, level of
local demand, degree of national integration and
competition are commonplaces found in the vast
literature on development economics. Porter
appears to be ignorant of this literature since he
does not cite any of its authors in his references,
even the most well known, either at present or in
the past, such as Celso Furtado, François Perrous,
Samir Amin or Gunder-Franck. More importantly,
he loses sight of the fact of the failure of
development economics because it accorded too
much importance to strictly economic factors like
those which make up the framework of Porter’s
model. As for the notion of specialization, referred
to so often in Porter’s thought, it is surely the oldest
and most outmoded notion of economics.
Forty years ago, notwithstanding the
success it enjoyed, Rostow’s theory of growth
stages was severely criticized for its linearity
(Rostow, 1960). Rostow imagined that there were
economic stages going from subsistence
economies to industrialized economies, through
which all countries go through with varying degrees
of success. This same linearity can be identified
and equally criticized in Porter’s work. The only
future horizon that it offers to countless economies
is the current state of the American and British
economies. There is a certain element of perversity
in this vision, in that if an economy manages to
develop in a way that differs from the patterns of
Anglo-Saxon economies, it will inevitably be
required to abandon the policy that enabled this
success and take the path defined by the American
or British economy. We are merely pushing Porter’s
logic to its extreme and noting its perversity. Porter
himself, in the chapter devoted to Korea, says as
much when he recommends that it abandon all
forms incentive planning, that it hand over strategic
investment decisions to the private sector, that it
orients education towards employability, and, to
be sure, that it accord special attention to
specialization (Porter, 1990: 688 ff.).
Among other things, the determinants in the
diamond model are a necessary reduction to enable
the continuity of Porter’s reasoning, in that he
attempts to compare different economies without
having to concern himself with their differences. It
is not easy to compare the maximalist financial logic
of the self-regulated, American-styled capitalist
market (which in recent times has moved towards
unimaginable and irrational summits of speculation
since the heady rush engendered and maintained
by Internet businesses and the Enron and
Worldcom scandals) to the kinds of “state-
regulated, social-market” industrial capitalism found
in Germany and Japan. Michel Albert (1991) made
very important distinctions between the behaviour
of shareholders (and therefore stock market
systems) in the United States, Japan, Scandinavia
and Germany. The latter economies are financed by
banks rather than by market speculation, and the
financial-capitalism kind of speculation (which
“valued” a business like Yahoo at more than $75
billion on the stock exchange even though it was
losing money) is “structurally” impossible in them
because dividend payments are limited to the real
value of the business’s assets and performance, in
addition to the emphasis on capital gains as the
mode of share payment rather than on maximal,
short-term profit. It is thus productive investments,
efforts to maintain jobs, job qualifications (which
are viewed as a socially recognized “right” rather
than a privilege that each individual has to fight
for), and research and development become
sources of gains and competitive advantages, and
not the inflation of fictive values based on savage
cuts (downsizing, dis-investments, synergetic
mergers-redeployments and other forms of
outsourcing), unpunished pollution and financial
manipulations.
Is it possible to imagine a model other than
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Porter’s to understand economic systems, both
national and business, that does a better job of
treating their complexity? The limits of the present
article prevent us from providing a detailed answer
to this question. However, we would like to cite the
example of the French school of regulation, which
in our view provides an framework for the analysis
of socio-productive systems, which is much richer
than Porter’s model, and which is far removed from
his linear simplicity and ideological tendencies. This
model is present in Boyer and Freyssenet (2000). A
socio-productive system is defined as “a largely
non-intentional process for determining the external
relevance and internal coherence of technical,
organizational, management and social changes in
response to new problems of economic profitability
and social acceptability, which emerged out the
previous model and the changes in the competitive,
macroeconomic and social context” (Boyer and
Freyssenet, 2000). The absence of intentionality
and the effect of composition in the creation of
socio-productive systems significantly reduces the
significant weight Porter’s assigns to strategies.
And it is not merely chance, as Porter would have it
in linking it with unlikely, rarely occurring events,
but the element of uncertainty and subtlety that all
complex systems go through during their
development. Within the context of national
systems, this can, for example, refer to the role of
the imaginary or of mythology in the articulation of
national economies and agents such as businesses
(Aktouf, 1996) or to the role of family structures
(Todd, 1988), etc.
What comes next are the innumerable
organizational, social, political and other factors
detailed by Boyer and Freyssenet while discussing
choice of indicators that enable them to be taken
into consideration. As such, several socio-
productive systems can co-exist without any one
of them necessarily and ineluctably representing
the future of the others. More fundamentally, this
model of socio-productive systems enables the
examination of economies confronted with
enormous economic, social and political problems,
that is, most of the world’s economies in Latin
America, in Africa, in eastern Europe and in Asia,
which Porter passes over in silence. This silence
conveniently allows him to side-step the core of
the problem facing the world economy and
globalization, namely, the domination of the rest of
the world by industrialized economies and their
managerial prescriptions. Similarly, he can also
avoid discussing the issue of the structural
adjustment plans ordered by the IMF and the
inextricable situations they engender in indebted
countries. As such, and once again, Porter’s
thought serves in reality to justify why the
dominant groups dominate and how they have
to continue to dominate, both at the national and
the business levels.
Two other points are worth discussing in The
Competitive Advantage of Nations. The first is
methodological in nature and concerns the case
method used by Porter. The second concerns the
use he makes of the notion of competition.
Porter has in effect a serious validity problem
in going from his hypotheses to their empirical
verification in the field. He notes in this regard that
a good number of explanations are based on
assumptions that are far removed from the reality
of competition, and that he encountered some
difficulties in making the majority of his hypotheses
fit the experience he acquired studying and working
with international businesses (Porter, 1990: xvi). In
addition, Porter displays a  positivism in the abusive
use of case studies as the only means for inferring
his theories. It is in fact a supposedly heuristic
approach which consists, as is often done with
the case method in management teaching (once
again, in an abusive manner, and not in itself), in
induction followed by deduction on the basis of
situations limited to and narrowly situated in space
(generally American space and, much less often,
other so-called advanced countries), in time (post-
war and during the triumphal ascension of scientism
in economics), and ideologically (the ideology of
the neo-liberal market, managers and those with
financial interests, to the exclusion of all others).
What is induced here are the purportedly univer-
sal rules and laws for governing decision making
and the behaviour of institutions in general. It is
worth recalling here that the sample of countries
used to establish the general theory of the
competitive advantage of nations consists in ten
countries made to fit into categories deduced from
even more limited realities, namely, businesses in
previously studied industrial sectors. Indeed, as
Porter himself admits, he merely transposed onto
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nations what he had deduced and written based on
“case studies” of businesses ten years earlier in
his work on the competitive strategies of
companies.
As for competition, Porter raises it the rank
of a paradigm. In the following section we digress
back to the corporate level to briefly examining both
direct and indirect critics of Porter who advocate
various degrees of co-operation and collaboration
as a means to achieve competitive advantage. The
subsequent sections then look at the limitations of
competition with respect to regional, national and
global economies.
PORTER VS CO-OPERATIVE DIMENSIONS
OF CORPORATE STRATEGY
Various academics began to consider the
possibilities of collective and collaborative
strategies. For example, Astley (1983), in considering
the growing complexity of the business
environment states “firms must consider a new level
of planning - collective strategy…The collective
approach helps enhance the awareness of
organisational nuances that are so important in
controlling the environment”. Ohmae (1989), in
looking at globalisation states “the simultaneous
developments involved in globalisation make
alliances necessary… are not tools of convenience,
but are critical instruments for serving customers
in global environment… This convergence of
customer needs, together with a relentless
dispersion of technology, has changed managers’
logic. To compete in the global arena, firms must
find partners that can help amortise the immense
fixed costs”.
Collaboration also began to be considered
by proponents of the Resource Based View. Hamel
and Prahalad (1989) in their study of 15 strategic
alliances see collaborations as a means to acquire
new technologies or skills, and “…collaboration as
competition in a different form…learning from
partners is paramount. Successful companies view
each alliance as a window on their partners’ broad
capabilities. They use the alliance to build skills in
areas outside the formal agreement and
systematically diffuse the knowledge throughout
their organisations”. Aguayo (1990: 83-92), in his
work on Quality Management, “…is not preaching
an end to competition but more co-operation –
competition in the framework of greater co-
operation”. He argues “quality cannot be obtained,
and improvement is impossible without co-
operation: co-operation among workers, among
managers, between the company and its suppliers,
and even between the company and its
competitors”. For example, he denounces Porter’s
position on dealing with suppliers by first quoting
him from Competitive Strategy (1980: 123-124):
Spread Purchases. Purchases of an item can
be spread among alternate suppliers in such a way
as to improve the firm’s bargaining position. The
business given to each individual supplier must be
large enough to cause the supplier concern over
losing it – spreading purchases too widely does
not take advantage does not take advantage of
structural bargaining position. However, purchasing
everything from one supplier may yield that supplier
too much of an opportunity to exercise power or
build switching costs. Cutting across these
considerations is the purchaser’s ability to negotiate
volume discounts, which is partly a matter of
bargaining power and partly a matter of  supplier
economics. Balancing these factors, the purchaser
would seek to create as much supplier dependence
on its business as possible and reap the maximum
volume discounts without exposing itself to too
great a risk of falling prey to switching costs.
According to Porter, by using the proper
strategy we can obtain the lowest possible price of
supply. But as Aguayo states, “…no mention is
made of  quality, reliability or improvement. Implicit
in this view is a win-lose view of the business
process”. He paraphrases Deming’s view in that
“price is meaningless without reference to quality.
What appears cheapest in price when coming in
the door may actually end up being more expensive
at the end. The point should be to lower total cost”.
He goes on to “urge companies to work toward
using one supplier for each part purchased. This
will lessen the variation for each part and improve
overall quality and costs…He (the supplier) can
devote time to working with the buyer , understand
the buyer’s needs, and find out how his product is
being used, which allows him to continually improve
and lower costs for both of them. Through mutual
co-operation they both win. Competitive strategy
offers no such possibility”.
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Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995), use game
theory to illustrate certain similar ideas brought
forward by Aguayo. Here they look at co-operation
with certain businesses to expand the size of the
market “pie” and competition with others to get as
large a slice of the market “pie” as possible. Unlike
Porter’s five forces model, their “Value Net” model
explicitly considers businesses whose products
complement other businesses from a resource and
knowledge standpoint – otherwise known as
complementors. In their view, not only do these
complementors make it easier to sell a given product,
but also to push technological development
forward due to the sharing of resources and
knowledge.  Moore (1996A, 1996B) goes further
along these lines by indicating that a mix of
collaboration and competition is required for
innovation to flourish. He uses the term coevolution
which in his words “means cultivating innovation
in an organisation and in others”. He specifies that
the “lead” company with a novel idea or product
requires it to work  with other companies’ products
and services such that they evolve in concert  with
each other.  He calls the resulting relationship an
“ecosystem”. The competitive or dominant twist in
his thinking is that he sees the lead company taking
leadership of the “ecosystem”. If we look at Porter,
his pursuit of  “a taylored value chain or series of
activities required to produce and deliver a product
or service in a unique and defensible manner” is
done purely through his five forces model (i.e.
existence  of direct competitors and purely
dominant relationships with suppliers and
customers). For Porter, any hint of alliances or
collaboration is viewed as a potential source of
erosion to long term competitive advantage.  His
position is understandable in the event that the
resultant collaboration creates nothing new and
unique (Porter, 2001B). But not all collaborations
are like this. We agree with Moore’s view that what
is required to produce a unique and defensible
competitive advantage is collaborative community-
like linkages to produce inter-company innovation,
which in turn, creates cross-supportive products
and services that are unique, hard to imitate and
therefore defensible. The inter-company
community-linkage and coevolution which Moore
speaks of is similar to certain key elements of  the
knowledge creation model developed by Nonaka
and Takeuchi (1995). They illustrated how
socialisation, which is essentially a sharing of
experiences, is a key step in cultivating tacit
knowledge. The ensuing step which is called
externalisation is where tacit knowledge is
converted to explicit knowledge. This
externalisation step requires group interaction and
discussions such that a tacit mental image is
converted into an explicit concept. This knowledge
conversion process, as Nonaka and Takeuchi point
out, is how new explicit knowledge is created. This
in turn is the basis for  competitive advantage via
innovation which Moore refers to.
In summary, we see that co-operation can
lead to lower costs, access to more skills and
knowledge, an increase in the size of the market
“pie” via product complementors, increased
differentiation and inimitability via complementary
product innovation (“ecosystems”), as well as act
as a catalyst for further knowledge creation and
innovation.
LIMITS OF COMPETITION WITH REGARD
TO REGIONAL AND NATIONAL
ECONOMIES
We can trace the genesis of the notion of
competition and the self-regulated market (via the
invisible hand) to Adam Smith (1973) in the 18th
century. But we had to wait for later economic
“science,” with the neo-classics, for the emergence
of a less poetic concept and the possibility of
integrating this concept into calculations intended
to be as learned and as exact as those in physics.
This was the objective set by Léon Walras. In
seeking a solution to the simultaneous equilibria
among quantities, prices and values necessary to
the functioning of a “pure” economy, he simply
and uncritically posited the existence of the
equivalent of a celestial mechanics of society (from
which we get pre-econometric formulations of
equilibrium problems in Newtonian terms) and the
intervention of an “auctioneer” (a kind of
equivalent to Maxwell’s demon in physics and
Quesnay’s “secretary general of the marketplace”)
who announced the equilibrium price of all
products and services, while remaining neutral
relative to the poles in the gravitational play
between suppliers and demanders (Walras, 1952).
However, there remained a significant problem to
be resolved, that of mathematically and scientifically
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accounting for this kind of simultaneous equilibria
in a given market while avoiding embarrassing
“celestial mechanics” and “auctioneer”
assumptions. It was Kenneth Arrow and Gérard
Debreu, two Nobel winners, who tackled this
formidable problem. They maintain that if there is a
mathematical solution to Walras’s problem, it is so
highly probabilistic that the state of the market’s
simultaneous equilibria can only be an
extraordinary accident (Arrow, 1983; Debreu,
1966). Moreover, Lipsey and Lancaster’s theorem,
which until that point had not been refuted, says
that the market obeys a kind of law of all or nothing,
that there cannot be two market states: either it is
fully a pure and perfect competitive economy
(100%) or not at all (0%). But we know that the pure
and perfect economy is at best wishful thinking;
therefore, there is only one solution: we are in a 0%
market situation. As such, we can ask a number of
questions: Who is manipulating this market, which
cannot under any circumstances be self-regulating?
What emerges is that Porter’s praise for competition
has an ideological function; it advocates
deregulation and privatization to the benefit of the
most powerful players.
At the operational level, we also see the
ineffectiveness of competition as sole notion to
embrace. For example, if we look at  Porter’s (1995A)
proposed strategy for America’s inner cities we hear
the familiar message:
“A sustainable economic base can be created
in the inner city only through private, for-
profit initiatives and investment based on
economic self-interest and genuine
competitive advantage. An economic model
must begin with the premise that inner city
businesses must be profitable and positioned
to compete on a regional, national, and even
international scale”.
In a rebuttal to his critics, Porter (1995B) states:
“We must stop trying to cure the problems of
these distressed urban areas by perpetually
expanding social programs and hoping that
economic activity will follow. Our nation’s
urban policies and programs have fallen into
the trap of only redistributing wealth. The
necessity and the real opportunity is to create
income and wealth, by harnessing the power
of market forces rather than trying to defy
them. The private sector must play a leading
role…. Government, community
organisations, and inner-city residents cannot
realistically and economically revitalise inner
cities alone - they lack the management skills,
technology, capital, and appropriate incentives”.
But Porter’s notion of  “harnessing the power
of market forces rather than trying to defy them” is
based on using his 5 forces positioning model
which, as we illustrated earlier, does not capture
the true nature and mechanisms of  achieving
competitive advantage. His strategy is too
macroscopic in nature (to his defence, Porter
clarifies that his strategy should be one component
of a larger strategy, albeit the leading one).  If we
accept that modern strategy is based on perpetual
innovation, then as we illustrated in earlier sections
this can only be achieved via practices that truly
acknowledge people as being the true sources of
competitive advantage and understanding that co-
operation/collaboration can be a key catalyst in
achieving knowledge creation and innovation. We
thus see affinities with Haynes and Nembhard’s
(1999) proposal of using “co-operative enterprise
development as a viable economic strategy for
inner-city redevelopment”. They cite successful
examples around the world producing “goods and
services for the market and providing social
conditions and work opportunities capable of
responding to human needs and developing human
potential”. One notable example includes the
Mondragon Co-operative Corporation (MCC). The
“corporation evolved from a small co-operative firm
built in the economically depressed Basque lands
of northern Spain, in the 1950s, into a modern-day
multinational corporation with over $8 billion in
assets and $3.5 billion in sales in 1993”. In 1999,
MCC was operated “by almost 30,000 worker-
owners organised into financial, industrial, and
distributional groupings. The MCC has become a
powerful force in shaping regional development
strategies and is a model of economic collaboration
which is highly respected throughout the world”.
They question the validity of neo-classical
economic theory, which is at the root of Porter’s
and other urban development analyses:
“The narrow framework of mainstream
economic theory upon which Porter’s ideas
are based does not respond to the broad
dimensions of community needs, nor does it
capture the value of the activity (labour)
expended in the service of bettering
community, with the profit motive tangential.
The sterile mathematical models of the modern
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economic theoretician are not synchronised
with or reflective of the policies and activities
of the practitioners who are attempting to
respond to the needs and assets of inner city
communities… Porter ’s call for private
enterprise development is actually industrial
policy under the mistaken assumption that the
building of industry is community economic
development. Even among his critics, many
of the solutions manifest themselves in
economic policy built around one component
of the economy-Industry. We acknowledge that
building effective industry is a critical
component of community revitalisation, but
argue that the current methods of organising
private enterprise through sole-propriety,
partnerships and corporations are too limited
to fulfil community needs for empowerment”.
They carefully remind the reader that “there
is little connection between work and better
outcomes for ghetto dwellers or for their
communities…. To move up economically requires
moving out. As a result, the link between job and
social betterment is lost collectively as achievers
move out of the ghetto rather than pass on social
and networking skills to the community or act as
the magnets for community human resource
recovery. Porter does not suggest ways to capture
this social capital in the community as it is
developed”. Co-operative enterprises are a viable,
self-sustaining and profitable alternative which offer
the opportunity to re-invest profits  back into the
community.
This is not to say we prone for the elimination
of competition altogether. Otherwise we risk drifting
into complacency and possible mismanagement.
For example, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) explain
how the Japanese tendency for consensus at all
cost carries the risk of generating knowledge
concepts to the level of the “the lowest common
denominator”. In their study of knowledge creation
they showed how lively conflictual discussions
tended to challenge the status quo so as to
continually improve explicit knowledge concepts.
It is with a somewhat sympathetic ear that
we listen to Porter’s (1999) objections to corporate
and national alliances where he cites specific
examples of government mismanagement of funds
and the use of subsidies to prop up ailing industries.
But unlike Porter, we believe the solution lies in
further improving the effectiveness of these co-
operative measures, not eliminating them
altogether. We must ensure that all stakeholders
(including the individual employee) not only
participate but understand that they must participate
and have a say in co-operative initiatives. This
should be coupled with the harnessing of the
competitive spirit that is within all of us towards
more continuous self-improvement and less
directed against each other. These two measures
conducted in tandem will bring out the best of all
people as well as ensure that we collectively reach
the “highest common denominator” in a profitable
manner.
LIMITS OF COMPETITION WITH REGARD
TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
As an assumption, international competition
is as improbable as competition in national markets,
due to the undeniable fact of the domination of the
planet’s economy by multinationals. The
considerable weight of multinationals cannot foster
healthy competition; rather it fosters concentration,
mega-mergers, quasi-monopolies and oligopolies.
Indeed, if there is competition, it is monopolisitc
competition, an expression which, according to
linguistics and the philosophy of language, is a
contradiction in terms. It is difficult to imagine fair
competition between partners displaying enormous
power disparities, such as is the case between the
powerful American and European economies and
the fragile economies of Mexico, India or Tunisia.
Indeed, according to “Decade of Executives,” a
detailed study available on the Internet, for
companies like GM, Ford, GE and IBM, NAFTA
(North American Free Trade Agreement) has only
resulted in real gains for American and Canadian
Presidents and CEOs (who have had raises ranging
from 400% to 600%), while productivity and labour
force gains have been around 18%-25%. For
Mexico, however, the result has been bankruptcies,
declines in local products and systematic wage
reductions.
As it appears to be viewed by Porter, free
trade is no more than a sort of race for domination,
a “competitiveness” which only assumes rivalries
and struggles, in a context of globalization viewed
above all as expanding beyond national boundaries
to encompass the entire planet — battles between
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businesses? — the whole of which is conceived in
terms of the American model, which is largely
invoked and treated as a managerial and economic
summit, an indisputable fact worth studying and
generalizing, for the good of all.
BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION: THE INTER-
BUSINESS EFFECTS OF PORTERISM
We have attempted to reveal the inadequacies
of Porter’s strategic thinking from a methodological
and epistemological point of view. We have also
sought to show that the praxiological promises of
this thought are impossible to realize given its
dubious, impossible-to-operationalize normativity
as well as it missing enormous fundamental issues
(as pointed out by the Resource Based theorists)
which a firm needs to assess and harness in order
to be truly successful in attaining a lasting,
defendable and not easily imitable competitive
advantage. Lastly, guided by the question of why
this perspective has enjoyed so much success
among academics, consultants and management,
we have suggested that the reason is not only to
be found in its content (ie. ease of understanding
and relative ease of implementation) but also in the
ideological role it plays in legitimizing situations of
domination at the business, industry and global
levels. At the business level, a specific model of
governance emerges from Porter’s thought, in which
domination is exercised by managerial spheres due
to the exorbitant power accorded to experts and
analysts. The degree of analytic, quantitative and
empirical expertise required by strategic
positioning, competitive advantage, the value chain,
and so on reinforces the image of the consultant
and management as “the only” experts and denies
the legitimacy of the participation of all of the
business’s other human components in the process
of conceiving strategy or in questioning the
strategy advocated. Indeed, experts are a priori
immunized from criticism because of the supposedly
“scientific” nature of their reasoning, analyses and
decisions. As a result, employees are reified as blind
system drones, confined to the role of performers,
“implementers” of strategies, which leads one to
think that Porter’s thought is merely another episode
in the long history of orthodox management
theories. In the final analysis, therefore, it is a
movement intended to reinforce centralized and
hierarchic characters, with their array of exclusive
privileges and dominant role, one that is in line with
the most conservative managerial ideologies. By
the same token, and given the highly specialized
character and the high-level position accorded to
expert-strategists, it is also an interdiction of any
kind of movement towards participatory
management, something which deprives
organizations that adhere to Porterism of a
significant competitive advantage enjoyed by
organizations operating within the embrace of the
Resource Based View who seek strength from within
the firm by acknowledging the importance of
employees, management style employed and the
social-corporate environment that is cultivated.
At the level of industries, Porter’s theory
justifies and legitimizes three general trends
inherent to the dominant financial capitalism:
domination by large corporations, the concentration
of capital, and excessive hierarchization-
centralization. As we have seen, Porter offers no
help to small actors in a given industry, or to
companies that want to draw more on their
employee’s knowledge and field experience in
formulating their strategies.
In addition, in his thought, all activity sectors
are viewed exclusively in terms of hostile relations
between competitors, between businesses and
consumers, between business and suppliers, and,
by the very features of its process of formulation
and implementation, between management and
employees. This conception is based largely on
relations of force in which the final word goes to
the strategist-analyst-expert, who leaves no room
for any other kind of relation. The war of all against
all and its corollary, the quest for domination, are
the foundation of the entire Porterian edifice. The
same logic is found in Porter’s discussion of the
industrial strategies of nations. At the global level,
the ideological thrust of Porterism is illustrated by
the fact that the only pathway implicitly offered to
emerging economies consists in reproducing
apparently proven ways of doing things. We say
“implicitly” because only dominant economies are
of interest to Porter, in that his thought is ultimately
limited to justifying the current state of relations of
force in the global economy, be it at the level of
markets and relations of businesses or at the level
of labour relations within a given business. But
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operationally, we have seen alternative options at
the inter-corporate level that are based on co-
operation and collaboration which can lead to lower
costs, access to more skills and knowledge, an
increase in size of the market “pie” via product
complementors, increased differentiation and
inimitability via complementary product innovation,
as well as act as a catalyst for further knowledge
creation and innovation. We have also visited a
viable and profitable alternative for developing
communities via cooperative enterprises who’s pri-
me mandate is to cultivate and strengthen  social
conditions and work opportunities capable of
responding to human needs and developing human
potential.
ENDNOTES
1 See the article on Porter on the ad hoc Web site.
2 Hafsi, T., Séguin, F. and Toulouse, J. M.,
Les Éditions Transcontinentales, Montréal,
second, reconsidered and enhanced edition,  2000.
3 Published by Wiley & Sons by three
Stanford professors: G. Saloner, A. Shepard and J.
Podolny.
4 We cite this interview often because it is
one of the rare documents in which Porter discusses
the methodological and epistemological aspects of
his thought, which are generally glossed over in
his central works.
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